wpa-supplicant: backport a patch to fix CVE-2015-1863

This fix was included in the master branch with the upgrade
to 2.4, backport it to fido as the vulnerability was already
present in 2.3.

Signed-off-by: Joshua Lock <joshua.lock@collabora.co.uk>

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc
index 1d171ef25a21715e26a88e6c37660e81fab91603..93a2aa8b74ec94738c0df1862e10d0b440bc4645 100644 (file)
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
            file://99_wpa_supplicant \
            file://fix-libnl3-host-contamination.patch \
+           file://0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch \
            file://0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch \
            file://0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch \
            file://0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch \

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..e108a93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
+ (CVE-2015-1863)
+
+This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
+p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
+was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
+arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
+dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
+heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
+peer discovery purposes.
+
+This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
+behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
+due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
+and potentially arbitrary code execution.
+
+Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
+hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Yue Tao <yue.tao@windriver.com>
+
+---
+ src/p2p/p2p.c |    1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
+index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
+--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
+@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
+       if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
+               os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+       if (msg.ssid &&
++          msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
+           (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
+            os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
+            != 0)) {
+-- 
+1.7.9.5
+