--- /dev/null
+Upstream-Status: Backport[https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/9b97f1787804]
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+CVE: CVE-2021-3156
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+# Date 1611416639 25200
+# Node ID 9b97f1787804aedccaec63c379053b1a91a0e409
+# Parent 90aba6ba6e03f3bc33b4eabf16358396ed83642d
+Reset valid_flags to MODE_NONINTERACTIVE for sudoedit.
+This is consistent with how the -e option is handled.
+Also reject -H and -P flags for sudoedit as was done in sudo 1.7.
+Found by Qualys, this is part of the fix for CVE-2021-3156.
+
+diff -r 90aba6ba6e03 -r 9b97f1787804 src/parse_args.c
+--- a/src/parse_args.c Mon Jan 18 12:30:52 2021 +0100
++++ b/src/parse_args.c Sat Jan 23 08:43:59 2021 -0700
+@@ -117,7 +117,10 @@
+ /*
+ * Default flags allowed when running a command.
+ */
+-#define DEFAULT_VALID_FLAGS (MODE_BACKGROUND|MODE_PRESERVE_ENV|MODE_RESET_HOME|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_SHELL)
++#define DEFAULT_VALID_FLAGS (MODE_BACKGROUND|MODE_PRESERVE_ENV|MODE_RESET_HOME|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS|MODE_SHELL)
++#define EDIT_VALID_FLAGS MODE_NONINTERACTIVE
++#define LIST_VALID_FLAGS (MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_LONG_LIST)
++#define VALIDATE_VALID_FLAGS MODE_NONINTERACTIVE
+
+ /* Option number for the --host long option due to ambiguity of the -h flag. */
+ #define OPT_HOSTNAME 256
+@@ -262,6 +265,7 @@
+ progname = "sudoedit";
+ mode = MODE_EDIT;
+ sudo_settings[ARG_SUDOEDIT].value = "true";
++ valid_flags = EDIT_VALID_FLAGS;
+ }
+
+ /* Load local IP addresses and masks. */
+@@ -365,7 +369,7 @@
+ usage_excl();
+ mode = MODE_EDIT;
+ sudo_settings[ARG_SUDOEDIT].value = "true";
+- valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
++ valid_flags = EDIT_VALID_FLAGS;
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ assert(optarg != NULL);
+@@ -377,6 +381,7 @@
+ break;
+ case 'H':
+ sudo_settings[ARG_SET_HOME].value = "true";
++ SET(flags, MODE_RESET_HOME);
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ if (optarg == NULL) {
+@@ -431,7 +436,7 @@
+ usage_excl();
+ }
+ mode = MODE_LIST;
+- valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE|MODE_LONG_LIST;
++ valid_flags = LIST_VALID_FLAGS;
+ break;
+ case 'n':
+ SET(flags, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE);
+@@ -439,6 +444,7 @@
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ sudo_settings[ARG_PRESERVE_GROUPS].value = "true";
++ SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ /* An empty prompt is allowed. */
+@@ -505,7 +511,7 @@
+ if (mode && mode != MODE_VALIDATE)
+ usage_excl();
+ mode = MODE_VALIDATE;
+- valid_flags = MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
++ valid_flags = VALIDATE_VALID_FLAGS;
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ if (mode && mode != MODE_VERSION)
+@@ -533,7 +539,7 @@
+ if (!mode) {
+ /* Defer -k mode setting until we know whether it is a flag or not */
+ if (sudo_settings[ARG_IGNORE_TICKET].value != NULL) {
+- if (argc == 0 && !(flags & (MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))) {
++ if (argc == 0 && !ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ mode = MODE_INVALIDATE; /* -k by itself */
+ sudo_settings[ARG_IGNORE_TICKET].value = NULL;
+ valid_flags = 0;
+@@ -601,7 +607,7 @@
+ /*
+ * For shell mode we need to rewrite argv
+ */
+- if (ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN) && ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL)) {
++ if (ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN)) {
+ char **av, *cmnd = NULL;
+ int ac = 1;
+
+
+
--- /dev/null
+From 03d04069468d6633be0d6ef6c4adff07620488da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2021 15:57:55 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] sudo: fix CVE-2021-3156
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/a97dc92eae6b]
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+CVE: CVE-2021-3156
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+# Date 1611416639 25200
+# Node ID a97dc92eae6b60ae285055441341d493c17262ff
+# Parent 9b97f1787804aedccaec63c379053b1a91a0e409
+Add sudoedit flag checks in plugin that are consistent with front-end.
+Don't assume the sudo front-end is sending reasonable mode flags.
+These checks need to be kept consistent between the sudo front-end
+and the sudoers plugin.
+
+---
+ plugins/sudoers/policy.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/policy.c b/plugins/sudoers/policy.c
+index c4749a6..2f18fe1 100644
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/policy.c
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/policy.c
+@@ -88,10 +88,11 @@ parse_bool(const char *line, int varlen, int *flags, int fval)
+ int
+ sudoers_policy_deserialize_info(void *v, char **runas_user, char **runas_group)
+ {
++ const int edit_mask = MODE_EDIT|MODE_IGNORE_TICKET|MODE_NONINTERACTIVE;
+ struct sudoers_open_info *info = v;
+- char * const *cur;
+ const char *p, *errstr, *groups = NULL;
+ const char *remhost = NULL;
++ char * const *cur;
+ int flags = 0;
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_deserialize_info, SUDOERS_DEBUG_PLUGIN);
+
+@@ -343,6 +344,12 @@ sudoers_policy_deserialize_info(void *v, char **runas_user, char **runas_group)
+ #endif
+ }
+
++ /* Sudo front-end should restrict mode flags for sudoedit. */
++ if (ISSET(flags, MODE_EDIT) && (flags & edit_mask) != flags) {
++ sudo_warnx(U_("invalid mode flags from sudo front end: 0x%x"), flags);
++ goto bad;
++ }
++
+ user_gid = (gid_t)-1;
+ user_sid = (pid_t)-1;
+ user_uid = (gid_t)-1;
--- /dev/null
+Upstream-Status: Backport[https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/049ad90590be]
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+CVE: CVE-2021-3156
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+# Date 1611416639 25200
+# Node ID 049ad90590be1e5dfb7df2675d2eb3e37c96ab86
+# Parent a97dc92eae6b60ae285055441341d493c17262ff
+Fix potential buffer overflow when unescaping backslashes in user_args.
+Also, do not try to unescaping backslashes unless in run mode *and*
+we are running the command via a shell.
+Found by Qualys, this fixes CVE-2021-3156.
+
+diff -r a97dc92eae6b -r 049ad90590be plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c Sat Jan 23 08:43:59 2021 -0700
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c Sat Jan 23 08:43:59 2021 -0700
+@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
+
+ /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
+ /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
+- if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
+ if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+@@ -932,8 +932,8 @@
+ if (user_cmnd == NULL)
+ user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
+
+- if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) {
+- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT|MODE_CHECK)) {
++ if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
+ const char *runchroot = user_runchroot;
+ if (runchroot == NULL && def_runchroot != NULL &&
+ strcmp(def_runchroot, "*") != 0)
+@@ -961,7 +961,8 @@
+ sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
+ debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR);
+ }
+- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) &&
++ ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
+ /*
+ * When running a command via a shell, the sudo front-end
+ * escapes potential meta chars. We unescape non-spaces
+@@ -969,10 +970,22 @@
+ */
+ for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) {
+ while (*from) {
+- if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1]))
++ if (from[0] == '\\' && from[1] != '\0' &&
++ !isspace((unsigned char)from[1])) {
+ from++;
++ }
++ if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) {
++ sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"),
++ __func__);
++ debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR);
++ }
+ *to++ = *from++;
+ }
++ if (size - (to - user_args) < 1) {
++ sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"),
++ __func__);
++ debug_return_int(NOT_FOUND_ERROR);
++ }
+ *to++ = ' ';
+ }
+ *--to = '\0';
+
+
--- /dev/null
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/09f98816fc89]
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+CVE: CVE-2021-3156
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+# Date 1611416640 25200
+# Node ID 09f98816fc8978f1d8623a857073d2d5746f0379
+# Parent 049ad90590be1e5dfb7df2675d2eb3e37c96ab86
+Fix the memset offset when converting a v1 timestamp to TS_LOCKEXCL.
+We want to zero the struct starting at flags, not type (which was just set).
+Found by Qualys.
+
+diff -r 049ad90590be -r 09f98816fc89 plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c Sat Jan 23 08:43:59 2021 -0700
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/timestamp.c Sat Jan 23 08:44:00 2021 -0700
+@@ -643,8 +643,8 @@
+ if (entry.size == sizeof(struct timestamp_entry_v1)) {
+ /* Old sudo record, convert it to TS_LOCKEXCL. */
+ entry.type = TS_LOCKEXCL;
+- memset((char *)&entry + offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, type), 0,
+- nread - offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, type));
++ memset((char *)&entry + offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, flags), 0,
++ nread - offsetof(struct timestamp_entry, flags));
+ if (ts_write(cookie->fd, cookie->fname, &entry, 0) == -1)
+ debug_return_bool(false);
+ } else {
+
+
--- /dev/null
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/rev/c125fbe68783]
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+CVE: CVE-2021-3156
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+# Date 1611416640 25200
+# Node ID c125fbe6878395d10f01d891d3c09b1229ada404
+# Parent 09f98816fc8978f1d8623a857073d2d5746f0379
+Don't assume that argv is allocated as a single flat buffer.
+While this is how the kernel behaves it is not a portable assumption.
+The assumption may also be violated if getopt_long(3) permutes arguments.
+Found by Qualys.
+
+diff -r 09f98816fc89 -r c125fbe68783 src/parse_args.c
+--- a/src/parse_args.c Sat Jan 23 08:44:00 2021 -0700
++++ b/src/parse_args.c Sat Jan 23 08:44:00 2021 -0700
+@@ -614,16 +614,16 @@
+ if (argc != 0) {
+ /* shell -c "command" */
+ char *src, *dst;
+- size_t cmnd_size = (size_t) (argv[argc - 1] - argv[0]) +
+- strlen(argv[argc - 1]) + 1;
++ size_t size = 0;
+
+- cmnd = dst = reallocarray(NULL, cmnd_size, 2);
+- if (cmnd == NULL)
++ for (av = argv; *av != NULL; av++)
++ size += strlen(*av) + 1;
++ if (size == 0 || (cmnd = reallocarray(NULL, size, 2)) == NULL)
+ sudo_fatalx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
+ if (!gc_add(GC_PTR, cmnd))
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+- for (av = argv; *av != NULL; av++) {
++ for (dst = cmnd, av = argv; *av != NULL; av++) {
+ for (src = *av; *src != '\0'; src++) {
+ /* quote potential meta characters */
+ if (!isalnum((unsigned char)*src) && *src != '_' && *src != '-' && *src != '$')
+
+
file://0001-sudo.conf.in-fix-conflict-with-multilib.patch \
file://CVE-2021-23239.patch \
file://CVE-2021-23240.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3156-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3156-2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3156-3.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3156-4.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3156-5.patch \
"
PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sudo.pam"
