binutls: Security fix for CVE-2017-16829

Affects: <= 2.29.1

Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.29.1.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.29.1.inc
index ba60eccf8782afbcba6078db2f8cbe2dd8b0d391..7966cc32487d948b73afa2f772ad31e5d4fde6dd 100644 (file)
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.29.1.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.29.1.inc
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
      file://CVE-2017-16827.patch \
      file://CVE-2017-16828_p1.patch \
      file://CVE-2017-16828_p2.patch \
+     file://CVE-2017-16829.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2017-16829.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2017-16829.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..f9410e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2017-16829.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From cf54ebff3b7361989712fd9c0128a9b255578163 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 21:57:29 +1030
+Subject: [PATCH] PR22307, Heap out of bounds read in
+ _bfd_elf_parse_gnu_properties
+
+When adding an unbounded increment to a pointer, you can't just check
+against the end of the buffer but also must check that overflow
+doesn't result in "negative" pointer movement.  Pointer comparisons
+are signed.  Better, check the increment against the space left using
+an unsigned comparison.
+
+       PR 22307
+       * elf-properties.c (_bfd_elf_parse_gnu_properties): Compare datasz
+       against size left rather than comparing pointers.  Reorganise loop.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Affects: <= 2.29.1
+CVE: CVE-2017-16829
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ bfd/ChangeLog        |  6 ++++++
+ bfd/elf-properties.c | 18 +++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+Index: git/bfd/elf-properties.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/bfd/elf-properties.c
++++ git/bfd/elf-properties.c
+@@ -93,15 +93,20 @@ bad_size:
+       return FALSE;
+     }
+ 
+-  while (1)
++  while (ptr != ptr_end)
+     {
+-      unsigned int type = bfd_h_get_32 (abfd, ptr);
+-      unsigned int datasz = bfd_h_get_32 (abfd, ptr + 4);
++      unsigned int type;
++      unsigned int datasz;
+       elf_property *prop;
+ 
++      if ((size_t) (ptr_end - ptr) < 8)
++      goto bad_size;
++
++      type = bfd_h_get_32 (abfd, ptr);
++      datasz = bfd_h_get_32 (abfd, ptr + 4);
+       ptr += 8;
+ 
+-      if ((ptr + datasz) > ptr_end)
++      if (datasz > (size_t) (ptr_end - ptr))
+       {
+         _bfd_error_handler
+           (_("warning: %B: corrupt GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE (%ld) type (0x%x) datasz: 0x%x"),
+@@ -182,11 +187,6 @@ bad_size:
+ 
+ next:
+       ptr += (datasz + (align_size - 1)) & ~ (align_size - 1);
+-      if (ptr == ptr_end)
+-      break;
+-
+-      if (ptr > (ptr_end - 8))
+-      goto bad_size;
+     }
+ 
+   return TRUE;
+Index: git/bfd/ChangeLog
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/bfd/ChangeLog
++++ git/bfd/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
+ 2017-10-17  Alan Modra  <amodra@gmail.com>
++ 
++       PR 22307
++       * elf-properties.c (_bfd_elf_parse_gnu_properties): Compare datasz
++       against size left rather than comparing pointers.  Reorganise loop.
++
++2017-10-17  Alan Modra  <amodra@gmail.com>
+ 
+        PR 22306
+        * aoutx.h (aout_get_external_symbols): Handle stringsize of zero,