--- /dev/null
+From 399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
+Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+
+Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
+order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
+implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
+certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
+attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
+
+CVE-2016-2178
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-2178
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 9 +++++----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
+ if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
+ goto err;
+ while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
+- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+- }
+
+ if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+@@ -282,6 +279,11 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
+ } else {
+ K = &k;
+ }
++
++ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
++ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++ }
++
+ DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
+ dsa->method_mont_p);
+ if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
