]> code.ossystems Code Review - openembedded-core.git/commitdiff
nss-3.15.1: fix CVE-2013-1739
authoryzhu1 <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
Wed, 18 Jun 2014 09:41:30 +0000 (05:41 -0400)
committerRichard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 24 Jun 2014 18:53:01 +0000 (19:53 +0100)
Mozilla Network Security Services (NSS) before 3.15.2 does
not ensure that data structures are initialized before
read operations, which allows remote attackers to cause a
denial of service or possibly have unspecified other
impact via vectors that trigger a decryption failure.

http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-1739
Signed-off-by: yzhu1 <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..1a159c3
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: yzhu1 <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
+
+--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
++++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+@@ -10509,7 +10509,7 @@ ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *pla
+     /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */
+     t = plaintext->len;
+     t -= paddingLength+overhead;
+-    /* If len >= padding_length+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
++    /* If len >= paddingLength+overhead then the MSB of t is zero. */
+     good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~t);
+     /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
+     t = blockSize - (paddingLength+1);
+@@ -10742,7 +10742,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+       }
+     }
+-    good = (unsigned)-1;
++    good = ~0U;
+     minLength = crSpec->mac_size;
+     if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+       /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */
+@@ -10756,14 +10756,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+     /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total
+      * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */
+     if (cText->buf->len < minLength) {
+-      SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: HandleRecord, record too small.",
+-               SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+-      /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
+-      ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+-      SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
+-      /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */
+-      PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
+-      return SECFailure;
++      goto decrypt_loser;
+     }
+     if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
+@@ -10831,11 +10824,18 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+       return SECFailure;
+     }
++    if (cipher_def->type == type_block &&
++      ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) {
++      goto decrypt_loser;
++    }
++
+     /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */
+     rv = crSpec->decode(
+       crSpec->decodeContext, plaintext->buf, (int *)&plaintext->len,
+       plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen);
+-    good &= SECStatusToMask(rv);
++    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++      goto decrypt_loser;
++    }
+     PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len));
+@@ -10843,7 +10843,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+     /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */
+     if (cipher_def->type == type_block) {
+-      const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->iv_size;
++      const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size;
+       const unsigned int macSize = crSpec->mac_size;
+       if (crSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
+@@ -10899,10 +10899,11 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+     }
+     if (good == 0) {
++decrypt_loser:
+       /* must not hold spec lock when calling SSL3_SendAlert. */
+       ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
+-      SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: mac check failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
++      SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+       if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+           SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_record_mac);
index 5afd63914b4458f1921416762802bf0aab5b7881..cc9e7b9cd265733c2cb055f0a6dd6129d17861c8 100644 (file)
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
     file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-5605.patch \
     file://nss-CVE-2014-1492.patch \
     file://nss-CVE-2013-1740.patch \
+    file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI_append_class-target = "\
     file://nss.pc.in \