+++ /dev/null
-From a06a6bf4e67a50561f6d6fb33534df1d3035ea34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Rishi <rishi_devan@mail.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 13:51:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-39017: Avoid infinite loop in the tarfile module
- (GH-21454)
-
-Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module
-(CVE-2019-20907).
-(cherry picked from commit 5a8d121a1f3ef5ad7c105ee378cc79a3eac0c7d4)
-
-Co-authored-by: Rishi <rishi_devan@mail.com>
-
-Removed testing 'recursion.tar' tar file due to binary data
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/c55479556db015f48fc8bbca17f64d3e65598559]
-CVE: CVE-2019-20907
-Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
----
- Lib/tarfile.py | 2 ++
- .../2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst | 1 +
- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 Lib/test/recursion.tar
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
-index d31b9cbb51d65..7a69e1b1aa544 100755
---- a/Lib/tarfile.py
-+++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
-@@ -1241,6 +1241,8 @@ def _proc_pax(self, tarfile):
-
- length, keyword = match.groups()
- length = int(length)
-+ if length == 0:
-+ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
- value = buf[match.end(2) + 1:match.start(1) + length - 1]
-
- # Normally, we could just use "utf-8" as the encoding and "strict"
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000000..ad26676f8b856
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-+Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module (CVE-2019-20907).
+++ /dev/null
-From 668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
- <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2020 13:39:12 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-39603: Prevent header injection in http methods
- (GH-18485)
-
-reject control chars in http method in http.client.putrequest to prevent http header injection
-(cherry picked from commit 8ca8a2e8fb068863c1138f07e3098478ef8be12e)
-
-Co-authored-by: AMIR <31338382+amiremohamadi@users.noreply.github.com>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf]
-CVE: CVE-2020-26116
-Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
-
----
- Lib/http/client.py | 15 +++++++++++++
- Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
- .../2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst | 2 ++
- 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
-index 019380a720318..c2ad0471bfee5 100644
---- a/Lib/http/client.py
-+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
-@@ -147,6 +147,10 @@
- # _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
- # We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
-
-+# These characters are not allowed within HTTP method names
-+# to prevent http header injection.
-+_contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x1f]')
-+
- # We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
- # servers will otherwise respond with a 411
- _METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
-@@ -1087,6 +1091,8 @@ def putrequest(self, method, url, skip_host=False,
- else:
- raise CannotSendRequest(self.__state)
-
-+ self._validate_method(method)
-+
- # Save the method for use later in the response phase
- self._method = method
-
-@@ -1177,6 +1183,15 @@ def _encode_request(self, request):
- # ASCII also helps prevent CVE-2019-9740.
- return request.encode('ascii')
-
-+ def _validate_method(self, method):
-+ """Validate a method name for putrequest."""
-+ # prevent http header injection
-+ match = _contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re.search(method)
-+ if match:
-+ raise ValueError(
-+ f"method can't contain control characters. {method!r} "
-+ f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
-+
- def _validate_path(self, url):
- """Validate a url for putrequest."""
- # Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
-index 8f0e27a1fb836..5a5fcecbc9c15 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
-@@ -364,6 +364,28 @@ def test_headers_debuglevel(self):
- self.assertEqual(lines[3], "header: Second: val2")
-
-
-+class HttpMethodTests(TestCase):
-+ def test_invalid_method_names(self):
-+ methods = (
-+ 'GET\r',
-+ 'POST\n',
-+ 'PUT\n\r',
-+ 'POST\nValue',
-+ 'POST\nHOST:abc',
-+ 'GET\nrHost:abc\n',
-+ 'POST\rRemainder:\r',
-+ 'GET\rHOST:\n',
-+ '\nPUT'
-+ )
-+
-+ for method in methods:
-+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-+ ValueError, "method can't contain control characters"):
-+ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
-+ conn.sock = FakeSocket(None)
-+ conn.request(method=method, url="/")
-+
-+
- class TransferEncodingTest(TestCase):
- expected_body = b"It's just a flesh wound"
-
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000000..990affc3edd9d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
-+Prevent http header injection by rejecting control characters in
-+http.client.putrequest(...).
