--- /dev/null
+From 6004b0e5ac2e8e9e1bb0f012dc9242e03cca95df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Date: Wed, 28 May 2014 23:09:58 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
+
+commit a3c54931199565930d6d84f4c3456f6440aefd41 upstream.
+
+Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
+
+This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
+
+eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
+audit rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
+
+This fixes CVE-2014-3917
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
+---
+ kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
+index 3b79a47..979c00b 100644
+--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
++++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
+@@ -733,6 +733,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
+ return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
+ }
+
++static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
++{
++ int word, bit;
++
++ if (val > 0xffffffff)
++ return false;
++
++ word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
++ if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
++ return false;
++
++ bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
++
++ return rule->mask[word] & bit;
++}
++
+ /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
+ * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
+ * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
+@@ -750,11 +766,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!list_empty(list)) {
+- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+-
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
++ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
+ &state, false)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+@@ -774,20 +787,16 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct audit_names *n,
+ struct audit_context *ctx) {
+- int word, bit;
+ int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
+ struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ enum audit_state state;
+
+- word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+- bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+-
+ if (list_empty(list))
+ return 0;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
++ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
+ ctx->current_state = state;
+ return 1;
+--
+1.9.1
+
